Classical Verification of Quantum Computations with Efficient Verifier by Chia, Nai-Hui et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
00
99
0v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
2 D
ec
 20
19
Classical Verification of Quantum Computations with
Efficient Verifier
Nai-Hui Chia1, Kai-Min Chung2, and Takashi Yamakawa∗3
1Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at Austin
2Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica
3NTT Secure Platform Laboratories
December 3, 2019
Abstract
In this paper, we extend the protocol of classical verification of quantum computations
(CVQC) recently proposed by Mahadev to make the verification efficient. Our result is obtained
in the following three steps:
• We show that parallel repetition of Mahadev’s protocol has negligible soundness error.
This gives the first constant round CVQC protocol with negligible soundness error. In this
part, we only assume the quantum hardness of the learning with error (LWE) problem
similarly to the Mahadev’s work.
• We construct a two-round CVQC protocol in the quantum random oracle model (QROM)
where a cryptographic hash function is idealized to be a random function. This is obtained
by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to the parallel repetition version of the Mahadev’s
protocol.
• We construct a two-round CVQC protocol with efficient verifier in the CRS+QRO model
where both prover and verifier can access to a (classical) common reference string generated
by a trusted third party in addition to quantum access to QRO. Specifically, the verifier can
verify a QTIME(T ) computation in time poly(n, logT ) where n is the security parameter.
For proving soundness, we assume that a standard model instantiation of our two-round
protocol with a concrete hash function (say, SHA-3) is sound and the existence of post-
quantum indistinguishability obfuscation and post-quantum fully homomorphic encryption
in addition to the quantum hardness of the LWE problem.
1 Introduction
Can we verify quantum computations by a classical computer? This problem has been a major
open problem in the field until Mahadev [Mah18] finally gave an affirmative solution. Specifically,
she constructed an interactive protocol between an efficient classical verifier (a BPP machine) and
an efficient quantum prover (a BQP machine) where the verifier can verify the result of the BQP
computation. (In the following, we call such a protocol a CVQC protocol.1) Soundness of her
protocol relies on a computational assumption that the learning with error (LWE) problem [Reg09]
∗This work was done in part while the author was visiting Academia Sinica.
1“CVQC” stands for “Classical Verification of Quantum Computations”
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is hard for an efficient quantum algorithm, which has been widely used in the field of cryptography.
We refer to the extensive survey by Peikert [Pei16] for details about LWE and its cryptographic
applications.
Though her result is a significant breakthrough, there are still several drawbacks. First, her
protocol has soundness error 3/4, which means that a cheating prover may convince the verifier
even if it does not correctly computes the BQP computation with probability at most 3/4. Though
we can exponentially reduce the soundness error by sequential repetition, we need super-constant
rounds to reduce the soundness error to be negligible. If parallel repetition works to reduce the
soundness error, then we need not increase the number of round. However, parallel repetition may
not reduce soundness error for computationally sound protocol in general [BIN97, PW07]. Thus,
it is still open to construct constant round protocol with negligible soundness error.
Another issue is about verifier’s efficiency. In her protocol, for verifying a computation that
is done by a quantum computer in time T , the verifier’s running time is as large as poly(T ).
Considering a situation where a device with weak classical computational power outsources com-
putations to untrusted quantum server, we may want to make the verifier’s running time as
small as possible. Such a problem has been studied well in the setting where the prover is
classical and we know solutions where verifier’s running time only logarithmically depends on
T [Kil92, Mic00, KRR13, KRR14, GKR15, RRR16, BHK17, BKK+18, HR18, CCH+19, KPY19].
Hopefully, we want to obtain a CVQC protocol for classical where the verifier runs in logarithmic
time.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper, we solve the above drawbacks of the Mahadev’s protocol. Our contribution is divided
into three parts:
• We show that parallel repetition version of Mahadev’s protocol has negligible soundness error.
This gives the first constant round CVQC protocol with negligible soundness error.
• We construct a two-round CVQC protocol in the quantum random oracle model (QROM)
[BDF+11] where a cryptographic hash function is idealized to be a random function that is
only accessible as a quantum oracle. This is obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform
[FS87, LZ19, DFMS19] to the parallel repetition version of the Mahadev’s protocol.
• We construct a two-round CVQC protocol with logarithmic-time verifier in the CRS+QRO
model where both prover and verifier can access to a (classical) common reference string gener-
ated by a trusted third party in addition to quantum access to QRO. For proving soundness,
we assume that a standard model instantiation of our two-round protocol with a concrete
hash function (say, SHA-3) is sound and the existence of post-quantum indistinguishability
obfuscation [BGI+12, GGH+16] and (post-quantum) fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
[Gen09] in addition to the quantum hardness of the LWE problem.
1.2 Related Works
Verification of Quantum Computation. There are long line of researches on verification of
quantum computation. Except for solutions relying on computational assumptions, there are two
type of settings where verification of quantum computation is known to be possible. In the first
setting, instead of considering purely classical verifier, we assume that a verifier can perform a
certain kind of weak quantum computations [BFK09, FK17, ABOEM17, MF18]. In the second
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setting, we assume that a prover is splitted into two remote servers that share entanglement but
do not communicate [RUV13]. Though these works do not give a CVQC protocol in our sense, the
advantage is that we need not assume any computational assumption for the proof of soundness,
and thus they are incomparable to Mahadev’s result and ours.
Subsequent to Mahadev’s breakthrough result, Gheorghiu and Vidick [GV19] gave a CVQC
protocol that also satisfies blindness, which ensures that a prover cannot learn what computation
is delegated. We note that their protocol requires polynomial number of rounds.
Concurrent Work. In a concurrent and independent work, Alagic et al. [ACH19] also shows
similar results to our first and second results, parallel repetition theorem for the Madadev’s protocol
and a two-round CVQC protocol by the Fiat-Shamir transform. We note that our third result, a
two-round CVQC protocol with efficient verification, is unique in this paper.
2 Preliminaries
Notations. For a finite set X , x
$
← X means that x is uniformly chosen from X . For finite sets
X and Y, Func(X ,Y) denotes the set of all functions with domain X and range Y. A function
f : N → [0, 1] is said to be negligible if for all polynomial p and sufficiently large n ∈ N, we have
f(n) < 1/p(n) and said to be overwhelming if 1− f is negligible. We denote by poly an unspecified
polynomial and by negl an unspecified negligible function. We say that a classical (resp. quantum)
algorithm is efficient if it runs in probabilistic polynomial-time (resp. quantum polynominal time).
For a quantum or randomized algorithm A, y
$
← A(x) means that A is run on input x and outputs
y and y := A(x; r) means that A is run on input x and randomness r and outputs y. For an
interactive protocol between a “prover” P and “verifier” V , y
$
← 〈P (xP ), V (xV ))〉(xP ) means an
interaction between them with prover’s private input xP verifier’s private input xV , and common
input x outputs y. We denote by QTIME(T ) a class of languages decided by a quantum algorithm
whose running time is at most T . We use n to denote the security parameter throughout the paper.
2.1 Learning with Error Problem
Roughly speaking, the learning with error (LWE) is a problem to solve system of noisy linear
equations. Regev [Reg09] proved that the hardness of LWE can be reduced to hardness of certain
worst-case lattice problems via quantum reductions. We do not give a definition of LWE in this
paper since we use the hardness of LWE only for ensuring the soundness of the Mahadev’s protocol
(Lemma 3.1), which is used as a black-box manner in the rest of the paper. Therefore, we use
exactly the same assumption as that used in [Mah18], to which we refer for detailed definitions and
parameter settings for LWE.
2.2 Quantum Random Oracle Model
The quantum random oracle model (QROM) [BDF+11] is an idealized model where a real-world
hash function is modeled as a quantum oracle that computes a random function. More precisely,
in the QROM, a random function H : X → Y of a certain domain X and range Y is uniformly
chosen from Func(X ,Y) at the beginning, and every party (including an adversary) can access to
a quantum oracle OH that maps |x〉 |y〉 to |x〉 |y ⊕H(x)〉. We often abuse notation to denote A
H
to mean a quantum algorithm A is given oracle OH .
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2.3 Cryptographic Primitives
Here, we give definitions of cryptographic primitives that are used in this paper. We note that they
are only used in Sec 5 where we construct an efficient verifier variant.
2.3.1 Pseudorandom Generator
A post-quantum pseudorandom generator (PRG) is an efficient deterministic classical algorithm
PRG : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}m such that for any efficient quantum algorithm A, we have∣∣∣∣∣ Pr
s
$←{0,1}ℓ
[A(PRG(s))]− Pr
y
$←{0,1}m
[A(y)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n).
It is known that there exists a post-quantum PRG for any ℓ = Ω(n) and m = poly(n) assuming
post-quantum one-way function [HILL99, Zha12]. Especially, a post-quantum PRG exists assuming
the quantum hardness of LWE.
2.3.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
A post-quantum fully homomorphic encryption consists of four efficient classical algorithm ΠFHE =
(FHE.KeyGen,FHE.Enc,FHE.Eval,FHE.Dec).
FHE.KeyGen(1n): The key generation algorithm takes the security parameter 1n as input and out-
puts a public key pk and a secret key sk.
FHE.Enc(pk,m): The encryption algorithm takes a public key pk and a message m as input, and
outputs a ciphertext ct.
FHE.Eval(pk, C, ct): The evaluation algorithm takes a public key pk, a classical circuit C, and a
ciphertext ct, and outputs a evaluated ciphertext ct′.
FHE.Dec(sk, ct): The decryption algorithm takes secret key sk and a ciphertext ct as input and
outputs a message m or ⊥.
Correctness. For all n ∈ N, (pk, sk)
$
← FHE.KeyGen(1n), m and C, we have
Pr[FHE.Dec(sk,FHE.Enc(pk,m)) = m] = 1
and
Pr[FHE.Dec(sk,FHE.Eval(pk, C,FHE.Enc(pk,m))) = C(m)] = 1.
Post-Quantum CPA-Security. For any efficient quantum adversary A = (A1,A2), we have
|Pr[1
$
← A2(|stA〉 , ct) : (pk, sk)
$
← FHE.KeyGen(1n), (m0,m1, |stA〉)
$
← A1(pk), ct
$
← FHE.Enc(pk,m0)]
− Pr[1
$
← A2(|stA〉 , ct) : (pk, sk)
$
← FHE.KeyGen(1n), (m0,m1, |stA〉)
$
← A1(pk), ct
$
← FHE.Enc(pk,m1)]|
≤ negl(n).
FHE is usually constructed by first constructing leveled FHE, where we have to upper bound the
depth of a circuit to evaluate at the setup, and then converting it to FHE by the technique called
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bootstrapping [Gen09]. There have been many constructions of leveled FHE whose (post-quantum)
security can be reduced to the (quantum) hardness of LWE [BV11, BGV12, Bra12, GSW13]. FHE
can be obtained assuming that any of these schemes is circular secure [CL01] so that it can be
upgraded into FHE via bootstrapping. We note that Canetti et al. [CLTV15] gave an alternative
transformation from leveled FHE to FHE based on subexponentially secure iO.
2.3.3 Strong Output-Compressing Randomized Encoding
A strong output-compressing randomized encoding [BFK+19] consists of three efficient classical
algorithms (RE.Setup,RE.Enc,RE.Dec).
RE.Setup(1n, 1ℓ, crs) : It takes the security parameter 1n, output-bound ℓ, and a common reference
string crs ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and outputs a encoding key ek.
RE.Enc(ek,M, inp, T ): It takes an encoding key ek, Turing machine M , an input inp ∈ {0, 1}∗, and
a time-bound T ≤ 2n (in binary) as input and outputs an encoding M̂inp.
RE.Dec(crs, M̂inp): It takes a common reference string crs and an encoding M̂inp as input and outputs
out ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥}.
Correctness. For any n ∈ N, ℓ, T ∈ N, crs ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, Turing machine M and input inp ∈ {0, 1}∗
such that M(inp) halts in at most T steps and returns a string whose length is at most ℓ, we have
Pr
[
RE.Dec(M̂inp, crs) =M(inp) : ek
$
← RE.Setup(1n, 1ℓ, crs), M̂inp
$
← RE.Enc(ek,M, inp, T )
]
= 1.
Efficiency. There exists polynomials p1, p2, p3 such that for all n ∈ N, ℓ ∈ N, crs
$
← {0, 1}ℓ:
• If ek
$
← RE.Setup(1n, 1ℓ, crs), |ek| ≤ p1(n, log ℓ).
• For every Turing machineM , time bound T , input inp ∈ {0, 1}∗, if M̂inp
$
← RE.Enc(ek,M, inp, T ),
then |M̂inp| ≤ p2(|M |, |inp|, log T, log ℓ, n),
• The running time of RE.Dec(crs, M̂inp) is at most min(T,Time(M,x)) · p3(n, log T )
Post-Quantum Security. There exists a simulator S such that for any M and inp such that
M(inp) halts in T ∗ ≤ T steps and |M(inp)| ≤ ℓ and efficient quantum adversary A,
|Pr[1
$
← A(crs, ek, M̂inp) : crs
$
← {0, 1}ℓ, ek
$
← RE.Setup(1n, 1ℓ, crs), M̂inp
$
← RE.Enc(ek,M, inp, T )]
− Pr[1
$
← A(crs, ek, M̂inp) : (crs, M̂inp)
$
← S(1n, 1|M |, 1|inp|,M(inp), T ∗), ek $← RE.Setup(1n, 1ℓ, crs)]| ≤ negl(n).
Badrinarayanan et al. [BFK+19] gave a construction of strong output-compressing randomized
encoding based on iO and the LWE assumption.
2.3.4 SNARK in the QROM
Let H : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n be a quantum random oracle. A SNARK for an NP language L
associated with a relation R in the QROM consists of two efficient oracle-aided classical algorithms
PHsnark and V
H
snark.
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PHsnark: It is an instance x and a witness w as input and outputs a proof π.
V Hsnark: It is an instance x and a proof π as input and outputs⊤ indicating acceptance or⊥ indicating
rejection.
We require SNARK to satisfy the following properties:
Completeness. For any (x,w) ∈ R, we have
Pr
H
[V Hsnark(x, π) = ⊤ : π
$
← PHsnark(x,w)] = 1.
Extractability. There exists an efficient quantum extractor Ext such that for any x and a malicious
quantum prover P˜Hsnark making at most q = poly(n) queries, if
Pr
H
[V Hsnark(x, π) : π
$
← P˜Hsnark(x)]
is non-negligible in n, then
Pr
H
[(x,w) ∈ R : w
$
← ExtP˜snark(x, 1q, 1n)]
is non-negligible in n.
Efficient Verification. If we can verify that (x,w) ∈ R in classical time T , then for any π
$
←
P˜Hsnark(x), V
H
snark(x, π) runs in classical time poly(n, |x|, log T ).
Chiesa et al. [CMS19] showed that there exists SNARK in the QROM that satisfies the above
properties.
3 Parallel Repetition of Mahadev’s Protocol
3.1 Overview of Mahadev’s Protocol
Here, we recall the Mahadev’s protocol [Mah18]. We only give a high-level description of the
protocol and properties of it and omit the details since they are not needed to show our result.
The protocol is run between a quantum prover P and a classical verifier V on a common input
x. The aim of the protocol is to enable a verifier to classically verify x ∈ L for a BQP language
L with the help of interactions with a quantum prover. The protocol is a 4-round protocol where
the first message is sent from V to P . We denote the i-th message generation algorithm by Vi for
i ∈ {1, 3} or Pi for i ∈ {2, 4} and denote the verifier’s final decision algorithm by Vout. Then a
high-level description of the protocol is given below.
V1: On input the security parameter 1
n and x, it generates a pair (k, td) of a“key” and “trapdoor”,
sends k to P , and keeps td as its internal state.
P2: On input x and k, it generates a classical “commitment” y along with a quantum state |stP 〉,
sends y to P , and keeps |stP 〉 as its internal state.
V3: It randomly picks c
$
← {0, 1} and sends c to P .2 For a knowledgeable reader, the case of c = 0
corresponds to the “test round” and the case of c = 1 corresponds to the “Hadamard round”
in the terminology in [Mah18].
2The third message is just a public-coin, and does not depend on the transcript so far or x.
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P4: On input |stP 〉 and c, it generates a classical string a and sends a to P .
Vout: On input k, td, y, c, and a, it returns ⊤ indicating acceptance or ⊥ indicating rejection. In
case c = 0, the verification can be done publicly, that is, Vout need not take td as input.
For the protocol, we have the following properties:
Completeness: For all x ∈ L, we have Pr[〈P, V 〉(x)] = ⊥] = negl(n).
Soundness: If the LWE problem is hard for quantum polynomial-time algorithms, then for any
x /∈ L and a quantum polynomial-time cheating prover P ∗, we have Pr[〈P ∗, V 〉(x)] = ⊥] ≤ 3/4.
We need a slightly different form of soundness implicitly shown in [Mah18], which roughly says
that if a cheating prover can pass the “test round” (i.e., the case of c = 0) with overwhelming
probability, then it can pass the “Hadamard round” (i.e., the case of c = 1) only with a negligible
probability.
Lemma 3.1 (implicit in [Mah18]). If the LWE problem is hard for quantum polynomial-time
algorithms, then for any x /∈ L and a quantum polynomial-time cheating prover P ∗ such that
Pr[〈P ∗, V 〉(x)] = ⊥ | c = 0] = negl(n), we have Pr[〈P ∗, V 〉(x)] = ⊤ | c = 1] = negl(n).
We will also use the following simple fact:
Fact 1. There exists an efficient prover that passes the test round with probability 1 (but passes the
Hadamard round with probability 0) even if x /∈ L.
3.2 Parallel Repetition
Here, we prove that the parallel repetition of the Mahadev’s protocol decrease the soundness bound
to be negligible. Let Pm and V m be m-parallel repetitions of the honest prover P and verifier V
in the Mahadev’s protocol. Then we have the following:
Theorem 3.2 (Completeness). For all m = Ω(log2(n)), for all x ∈ L, we have Pr[〈Pm, V m〉(x)] =
⊥] = negl(n).
Theorem 3.3 (Soundness). For all m = Ω(log2(n)), if the LWE problem is hard for quantum
polynomial-time algorithms, then for any x /∈ L and a quantum polynomial-time cheating prover
P ∗, we have Pr[〈P ∗, V m〉(x)] = ⊤] ≤ negl(n).
The completeness (Theorem 3.2) easily follows from the completeness of the Mahadev’s protocol.
In the next subsection, we prove the soundness (Theorem 3.3).
3.3 Proof of Soundness
We prove the soundness by showing that for all noticeable error ǫ, there exists a number m such
that by parallelly repeating the protocol m times, the error can be reduced to less than ǫ.
Characterization of cheating prover. Any cheating prover can be characterized by a tuple
(U0, {Uc}c∈{0,1}m) of unitaries over Hilbert space HX⊗HZ⊗HY⊗HK⊗HC. A prover characterized
by (U0, {Uc}c∈{0,1}m) works as follows.3
Second Message: Upon receiving k = (k1, ..., km), it applies U0 to the state |0〉X⊗ |0〉Z ⊗ |0〉Y ⊗
|k〉
K
, and then measures the Y register to obtain y = (y1, ..., ym). Then it sends y to V and
keeps the resulting state |ψ(k, y)〉 over HX,Z.
3Here, we hardwire into the cheating prover the instance x /∈ L on which it will cheat instead of giving it as an
input.
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Forth Message: Upon receiving c ∈ {0, 1}m, it applies Uc to |ψ(k, y)〉X,Z |0〉C and then measures
the X register in computational basis to obtain a = (a1, ..., am). We denote the designated
register for ai by Xi. Then, we can view the verifier’s verification procedure on ith trial as a
unitary Vi.
In the following, we first introduced the Jordan’s lemma, which we will use to prove Lemma 3.5.
Lemma 3.4 (Jordan’s lemma). Given any two projectors Π1 and Π2. There exists a decomposition
of the Hilbert space into one-dimensional and two-dimensional subspaces, which satisfy the following
properties:
• All subspaces are orthogonal to each other.
• For any two-dimensional subspace S, for all |s〉 ∈ S, Π1 |s〉 ∈ S and Π2 |s〉 ∈ S.
• For any two-dimensional subspace S, Π1 and Π2 are rank-one projectors, i.e., there exist two
vectors |v1〉 and |v2〉 in S such that for all |s〉 ∈ S, Π1 |s〉 = 〈v1|s〉 |v1〉 and Π2|s〉 = 〈v2|s〉 |v2〉.
Fix k, y and the function f . Let i ∈ [m], we consider two projectors
Πin := |0〉〈0|C ⊗ IX,Z
Πi,out := (UHC−i)
†(
∑
b,x:fk(b,x)=y
|b, x〉〈b, x|Xi )⊗ IC,X−i,Z(UHC−i),
where U can be any prover’s strategy. X−i := X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xm, and HC−i means ap-
plying Hadamard operators to registers C1, . . . ,Ci−1,Ci+1, . . . ,Cm. By using Jordan’s lemma, we
can decompose the space HC,X,Z in the two-dimensional subspaces S1, . . . , Sℓ and one-dimensional
subspaces Sℓ+1, . . . , Sp′ which are vectors on either Πin or Πi,out. Furthermore, Πin and Πi,out on
S1, . . . , Sp′ are rank-one projectors |α1〉〈α1|, . . . , |αp′〉〈αp′ | and |β1〉〈β1|, . . . , |βp′〉〈βp′ |. For j ∈ [p
′],
we let the angles between |αj〉 and |βj〉 as θj. Then, we define projectors
Πin,≥γ := IC ⊗ (
∑
j:θj≥γ
|αj〉〈αj |X,Z)
Πin,≤γ := IC ⊗ (
∑
j:θj≤γ
|αj〉〈αj |X,Z).
Lemma 3.5. Let (U0, U) be any prover’s strategy. Let i ∈ [m]. Let γ0, δ ∈ [0, 1] where 2
mγ0 << 1.
Let T ∈ N, where γ0/T >> δ and γ0/T = 1/poly(n). Let γ be sampled uniformly randomly from
[γ0T ,
2γ0
T , . . . ,
Tγ0
T ] and 2
m−1 << γ0T . Then, there exists an efficient quantum algorithm Gi,γ,δ such
that for any efficiently generated quantum state |ψ〉
X,Z,
Gi,γ,δ |0〉C |ψ〉X,Z |0〉ph |0〉th |0〉in = |0〉C |ψ0〉X,Z |001〉+ |0〉C |ψ1〉X,Z |011〉+ |ψ
′
err〉 .
Furthermore, the following properties are satisfied.
1. If we define |ψerr〉X,Z := |ψ〉X,Z−|ψ0〉X,Z−|ψ1〉X,Z, then we have Eγ [‖ |ψerr〉 ‖
2] ≤ 1T +negl(n).
2. Prγ [Mph,th,in◦(Gi,γ,δ |0〉C |ψ〉X,Z |0〉ph |0〉th |0〉in) /∈ {0
t01, 0t11}] ≤ 1T +negl(n), whereMph,th,in
is the standard-basis measurement in the register (ph, th, in), and t is the number of qubits in
ph. Furthermore,
Eγ [‖ψerr‖
2] ≤
1
T
+ negl(n).
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3. Ec∈{0,1}[‖ |ψc〉 ‖2] ≤ 1/2.
4. ‖Πin,≥γ−2δ |ψ1〉 ‖2 ≥ (1− negl(n))‖ |ψ1〉 ‖2. This implies that there exists an polynomial-time
cheating prover with |ψ1〉 that can be accepted in the test round with 1− negl(n) probability.
5. ‖Πin,≤γ |ψ0〉 ‖2 ≥ (1− negl(n))‖ |ψ0〉 ‖2.
Remark 1. To prove Theorem 3.3, we only need m to be at most log(n). Hence, γ0 and T can be
1/poly(n).
Proof of Lemma 3.5. We can consider Uc as a unitary U operating on registers C, X, and Z.
Procedure 1 defines an efficient process Gi,γ,δ, which decomposes |0〉C |ψ〉X,Z into states described
in Lemma 3.5.
Procedure 1 Gi,γ,δ
We define R1 := I − 2Πi,out, R2 := 2Πin − I, and Q := R2R1.
1. Do quantum phase estimation Uest on Q with input state |ψ〉 and t-bit precision for
parameter t which will be specified later, i.e.,
Uest |u〉 |0〉 →
∑
θ
αθ |u〉 |θ〉 ,
such that
∑
θ/∈θˆ±ǫ/2 |αθ|
2 ≤ 2−n.
2. Sample γ from {γ0/T, . . . , γ0} and then apply Uth : |u〉 |θ〉 |0〉th
Uth−−→ |u〉 |θ〉 |b〉th, where
b = 1 if θ ∈ [γ − δ/2, 2π − γ + δ/2].
3. Apply U †est.
4. Apply Uin : |c〉C |0〉in
Uin−−→ |c〉
C
|b′〉in, where b
′ = 1 if c 6= 0.
Here, Gi,γ,δ := UinU
†
estUthUest operates on register C, X, Z, and additional registers ph, th, and
in.
We let |u+j 〉 :=
1√
2
(|βj〉+ i |β
⊥
j 〉) and |u
−
j 〉 :=
1√
2
(|βj〉− i |β
⊥
j 〉) for j ∈ [ℓ], which are eigenvectors
of Q. For each one-dimensional subspace, it is either a vector in Πin or Πi,out. We only consider
vectors in Πin, and denote them as |αℓ+1〉 , . . . , |αp〉. Obviously, they are also eigenvectors of Q (with
eigenvalues equal to zero). The eigenvalues corresponding to |u+j 〉 are e
iθj and |u−j 〉 are e
i(2π−θj).
Now, we can decompose any input state as
|0〉
C
|ψ〉
X,Z |0〉ph |0〉th |0〉in :=
p∑
j=1
dj |0〉C |αj〉X,Z |0〉ph |0〉th |0〉in .
We suppose that |ψ〉 are on the two-dimensional subspaces without loss of generality. Then,
since each |αj〉 for j ∈ [ℓ] can be represented as a
+
j |u
+
j 〉+ a
−
j |u
−
j 〉, we rewrite the state in the basis
of eigenvectors as
|0〉
C
|ψ〉
X,Z |0〉ph |0〉th |0〉in :=
ℓ∑
j=1
(e+j |u
+
j 〉C,X,Z + e
−
j |u
−
j 〉C,X,Z) |0〉ph |0〉th |0〉in , (1)
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where e+j = a
+
j dj and e
−
j = a
−
j dj .
We define a function
∆(a; b) =
{
1 if a ∈ [b, 2π − b]
0 otherwise
In the following, we apply Uest and Uth to the state in Eq. 1 to estimate the eigenvalues of each
|uj〉.
UthUest |0〉C |ψ〉X,Z |0〉ph |0〉th |0〉in (2)
= Uth
ℓ∑
j=1
e+j |u+j 〉 (∑
θ˜+j
wθ˜+j
|θ˜+j 〉ph) + e
−
j |u
−
j 〉 (
∑
θ˜−j
wθ˜−j
|θ˜−j 〉ph)
 |0〉th |0〉in (3)
=
∑
j:θj∈[γ,2π−γ]
e+j |u
+
j 〉
∑
θ˜+j
|θ˜+j 〉 |∆(θ˜
+
j , γ − δ)〉 |0〉
+ e−j |u−j 〉
∑
θ˜−j
|θ˜−j 〉 |∆(θ˜
−
j , γ − δ)〉 |0〉
 (4)
+
∑
j:θj /∈[γ−2δ,2π−γ+2δ]
e+j |u
+
j 〉
∑
θ˜+j
|θ˜+j 〉 |∆(θ˜
+
j , γ − δ)〉 |0〉
+ e−j |u−j 〉
∑
θ˜−j
|θ˜−j 〉 |∆(θ˜
−
j , γ − δ)〉 |0〉

(5)
+
∑
j:θj∈[γ−2δ,γ]∨[2π−γ,2π−γ+δ]
(
e+j |u
+
j 〉 |φ
+
j 〉ph,th + e
−
j |u
−
j 〉 |φ
−
j 〉ph,th
)
|0〉in . (6)
Here, w
θ˜+j
= 12t
(
1−e2πi(2
tθ+
j
−(b+
j
+θ˜+
j
))
1−e2πi(θ
+
j
−(b+
j
+θ˜+
j
)/2t)
)
and w
θ˜−j
= 12t
(
1−e2πi(2
tθ−
j
−(b−
j
+θ˜−
j
))
1−e2πi(θ
−
j
−(b−
j
+θ˜−
j
)/2t)
)
for b±j the best t bit
approximation to θ±j which is less than θ
±
j for j ∈ [ℓ].
To successfully obtain θj with accuracy δ with probability 1 − ǫ for ǫ be negligible, we can
choose t = O(log n). Note that simply applying phase estimation with O(log n)-bit precision can
not guarantee ǫ to be negligible. However, by parallelly applying phase estimation polynomially
times and taking the most commonly occurring outcome, one can reduce ǫ to be negligible as shown
by Watrous in [Wat06].
By applying U †est, the state above will be∑
j:θj∈[γ,2π−γ]
e+j |u+j 〉
z+j |0〉ph |1〉th +√1− |z+j |2(∑
i 6=0t1
h+i |i〉ph,th)
 |0〉 (7)
+e−j |u
−
j 〉
z−j |0〉ph |1〉th +√1− |z−j |2(∑
i 6=0t1
h−i |i〉ph,th)
 |0〉
 (8)
+
∑
j:θj /∈[γ−2δ,2π−γ+2δ]
e+j |u+j 〉
z+j |0〉ph |1〉th +√1− |z+j |2(∑
i 6=0t0
h+i |i〉ph,th)
 |0〉 (9)
+e−j |u
−
j 〉
z−j |0〉ph |1〉th +√1− |z−j |2(∑
i 6=0t0
h−i |i〉ph,th)
 |0〉
 (10)
+
∑
j:θj∈[γ−2δ,γ]∨[2π−γ,2π−γ+δ]
(
e+j |u
+
j 〉 |φ
+
j 〉ph,th + e
−
j |u
−
j 〉 |φ
−
j 〉ph,th
)
|0〉in . (11)
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Here, z+j = z
−
j for all j. Let zj = z
+
j = z
−
j , then |zj |
2 ≥ 1 − ǫ if θj ∈ [γ, 2π − γ] or θj /∈
[γ − 2δ, 2π − γ + 2δ]. We can rewrite the state above in the basis of |α1〉 , . . . , |αp〉.∑
j:θj∈[γ,2π−γ]
zjdj |0〉C |αj〉X,Z |0〉ph |1〉th |0〉in (12)
+
∑
j:θj /∈[γ−2δ,2π−γ+2δ]
zjdj |0〉C |αj〉X,Z |0〉ph |0〉th |0〉in (13)
+
∑
j:θj∈[γ,2π−γ]
√
1− |zj |2
e+j |u+j 〉 (∑
i 6=01
h+i |i〉ph,th) |0〉 + e
−
j |u
−
j 〉 (
∑
i 6=01
h−i |i〉ph,th)
 |0〉 (14)
+
∑
j:θj /∈[γ−2δ,2π−γ+2δ]
√
1− |zj |2
e+j |u+j 〉 (∑
i 6=00
h+i |i〉ph,th) |0〉 + e
−
j |u
−
j 〉 (
∑
i 6=00
h−i |i〉ph,th)
 |0〉 (15)
+
∑
j:θj∈[γ−2δ,γ]∨[2π−γ,2π−γ+2δ]
(
e+j |u
+
j 〉 |φ
+
j 〉ph,th + e
−
j |u
−
j 〉 |φ
−
j 〉ph,th
)
|0〉in . (16)
Notably, the state Eq. 16 can only have expected norm 1/T over the choice of γ ∈ {γ0T ,
2γ0
T , . . . , γ0}.
Moreover, the norms of states in Eq. 14 and Eq. 15 can only be negligible since the phase estimation
has success probability at least 1− negl(n).
By applying Uin, we can write the output state of Gi,γ,δ as ∑
j:θj∈[γ−2δ,2π−γ+2δ]
zjdj |0〉C |αj〉X,Z + |η〉
 |0〉ph |1〉th |1〉in (17)
+
 ∑
j:θj /∈[γ,2π−γ]
zjdj |0〉C |αj〉X,Z + |η
′〉
 |0〉ph |0〉th |1〉in (18)
+
∑
s∈{0,1}t+2\{0t11,0t+11}
|ψ′s〉C,X,Z |s〉ph,th,in . (19)
Here, |η〉 and |η′〉 are errors from the states in Eq. 15 and Eq. 14 after applying Uin. Furthermore,
the range of θj has been changed from [γ, 2π − γ] to [γ − 2δ, 2π − γ + 2δ] in Eq. 12 and from
[γ−2δ, 2π−γ+2δ] to [γ, 2π−γ] in Eq. 17 and Eq. 18. This follows from the fact that there can be
additional state from the state in Eq. 16 after applying Uin. Therefore, ‖ |η〉 ‖ and ‖ |η
′〉 ‖ can only
be negligible, and the probability that measuring the register ph, th, in of the state gives neither
0t11 nor 0t+11 is at most 1/T + negl(n).
We then define
|ψ1〉 :=
∑
j:θj∈[γ−2δ,2π−γ+2δ]
zjdj |αj〉X,Z + |η〉
|ψ0〉 :=
∑
j:θj /∈[γ,2π−γ]
zjdj |αj〉X,Z + |η
′〉 .
|ψerr〉 := |ψ〉 − |ψ0〉 − |ψ1〉 .
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It is worth noting that
|0〉
C
|ψ〉
X,Z = |0〉C |ψ0〉X,Z + |0〉C |ψ1〉X,Z +
∑
s∈{0,1}t+2\{0t11,0t+11}
|ψ′s〉C,X,Z
= |0〉
C
(|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉+ |ψerr〉).
Now, we are going to prove that the five properties of the lemma are correct. First, it is
obvious that |ψ〉 = |ψ0〉 + |ψ1〉 + |ψerr〉. Then, as we have explained in the previous paragraph,
the probability that measuring the register ph, th, in of the state gives neither 0t11 nor 0t+11 is at
most 1/T + negl(n). Then, we prove that Eγ [‖ |ψerr〉 ‖
2] is at most 1/T + negl(n). The errors come
from the state in Eq. 6 are on the eigenvectors with eigenvalues in [γ− 2δ, γ]∨ [2π− γ, 2π− γ+2δ],
therefore, the error can be at most
∑
j:θj∈[γ−2δ,γ]∨[2π−γ,2π−γ+2δ] ||e
+
j |
2+ |e−j |
2, which expected value
is at most 1/T over the choice of γ. The errors from the states in Eq. 15 and Eq. 14 are at most
negligible. This proves the second property. Then, |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 may not be orthogonal. However,
‖ |ψ0〉 ‖
2 + ‖ |ψ1〉 ‖
2 ≤ 1 since ‖ |0〉
C
|ψ0〉X,Z |001〉+ |0〉C |ψ1〉X,Z |011〉 ‖
2 ≤ 1 and |0〉
C
|ψ0〉X,Z |001〉
and |0〉
C
|ψ1〉X,Z |011〉 are orthogonal. This also implies that
Ec∈{0,1}[‖ |ψc〉 ‖2] ≤ 1/2.
Finally, fix ki, yi, and let bi, xi satisfy that fki(bi, xi) = yi. Then, given any c−i, there exists a
unitary Uc such that
Pr[MX ◦ (Uc |ψ0〉) = bi, xi] ≤ 2
mγ
Pr[MX ◦ (Uc |ψ1〉) = bi, xi] ≥ 1− negl(n).
This follow from the fact that on average over c−i, Pr[MX ◦ (UH−i |0〉C |ψ0〉) = bi, xi] ≤ γ and
Pr[MX ◦ (UH−i |0〉C |ψ1〉) = bi, xi] ≥ 1 − negl(n). We can show that Pr[MX ◦ (UH−i |0〉C |ψ0〉) =
bi, xi] ≤ γ and Pr[MX ◦ (UH−i |0〉C |ψ1〉) = bi, xi] ≥ 1 − negl(n) by using the error reduction
procedure by Marriott and Watrous in [MW05]. This completes the proof.
In Lemma 3.5, we show that by fixing any i ∈ [m], we can partition any prover’s state into |ψ0〉,
|ψ1〉, and |ψerr〉 such that |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 will be rejected and accepted in the test round with high
probability.
In the following, we show another procedure that further decompose the prover’s state according
to any given c ∈ {0, 1}n.
Lemma 3.6. For any c ∈ {0, 1}m, the state |ψ〉 can be partitioned as follows by using Procedure 2.
|ψ〉 = |ψc1〉+ |ψc¯1,c2〉+ · · · + |ψc¯1,...,c¯m−1,cm〉+ |ψc¯1,...,c¯m〉+ |ψerr〉 .
Further, the following properties are satisfied. For any c ∈ {0, 1}m, we have
1. For any i ∈ [m], |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,0〉 is rejected in the ith test round with probability at most 2
mγ.
2. There exists an polynomial-time cheating prover with |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,1〉 that can be accepted in the
test round with 1− negl(n) probability.
3. Eγ1,...,γm[‖ |ψerr〉 ‖
2] ≤ m
2
T + negl(n).
Moreover, for any fixed γ, we have Ec[‖ |ψc¯1,...,c¯m〉 ‖
2] ≤ 2−m.
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Procedure 2 Hc
Let (ph1, th1, in1), . . . , (phm, thm, inm) be additional registers that Hc will use.
1. Sample γ1 from {
γ0
T ,
2γ0
T , . . . , γ0}. Apply G1,γ1,δ on |ψ〉 |0〉ph1,th1,in1 to obtain
|ψ0〉 |0
t01〉+ |ψ1〉 |0
t11〉+
∑
s1∈{0,1}t+2\{0t01,0t11}
|ψ′s1〉 |s1〉 .
2. For i = 2, . . . ,m,
(a) Sample γi from {
γ0
T ,
2γ0
T , . . . , γ0}.
(b) Apply Gi,γi,δ on |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1〉 |0〉phi,thi,ini to decompose the state into
|ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,0〉 |0
t01〉+ |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,1〉 |0
t11〉+
∑
si∈{0,1}t+2\{0t01,0t11}
|ψ′si〉 |si〉 .
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on i ∈ [m]. When i = 1,
|ψ〉 = |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉+ |ψerr1〉 ,
where |ψ0〉, |ψ1〉, and |ψerr1〉 satisfy all the properties of Lemma 3.6 according to Lemma 3.5.
We suppose the hypothesis is true when i = k. Then, when i = k + 1, we can decompose the
state |ψ〉 as follows
|ψ〉 = |ψc1〉+ |ψc¯1,c2〉+ · · ·+ |ψc¯1,...,c¯k,ck+1〉+ |ψc¯1,...,c¯k,c¯k+1〉+
k+1∑
j=1
|ψerrj 〉 .
|ψc¯1,...,c¯k,ck〉 also satisfies the first two properties according to Lemma 3.5, and the third property
follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Finally, as E[|ψc¯1,...,c¯k〉] ≤ 2
−k, it is obvious that
E[|ψc¯1,...,c¯k,c¯k=1〉] ≤ 2
−(k+1) according to Lemma 3.5.
Given Lemma 3.6, we can start proving Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. According to Lemma 3.1, we know that
Pr
k,y
[U0 |ψ(k, y)〉 wins test round] ≥ 1− negl(n)⇒ Pr
k,y
[U0 |ψ(k, y)〉 wins Hadamard round] ≤ negl(n),
Here,
U0 |0〉Y |0〉X,Z |k〉K
measure Y
−−−−−−−−→ |ψ(k, y)〉
X,Z |k〉K .
In the following, we just write |ψ〉 to mean |ψ(k, y)〉.
For each i ∈ [m], let Vi,0 and Vi,1 be unitaries that run the verification procedure in the test
and Hadamard round on the i-th trial and write the verification result in a designated register and
Mi be the measurement on the designated register on the i-th trial. For any state |φ〉, we denote
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M ◦ |φ〉 = ⊤ to mean Mi ◦ |φ〉 = ⊤ for all i ∈ [m] for notational simplicity. With this notation, a
cheating prover’s success probability can be written as
Pr[M ◦ ((V1,c1 · · ·Vm,cm)Uc |ψ〉) = ⊤].
According to Lemma 3.6, for any fixed c ∈ {0, 1}m, we can decompose |ψ〉 as
|ψ〉 = |ψc1〉+ |ψc¯1,c2〉+ · · ·+ |ψc¯1,...,c¯m−1,cm〉+ |ψc¯1,...,c¯m−1,c¯m〉+ |ψerr〉 .
To prove the theorem, we first show the following two inequalities holds for any i ∈ [m] and
fixed c ∈ {0, 1}m:
Pr[Mi ◦ (Vi,0Uc |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,0〉) = ⊤] ≤ 2
mγ0. (20)
‖ |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,1〉 ‖
2 Pr[Mi ◦ (Vi,1Uc |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,1〉) = ⊤] = negl(n). (21)
Eq. 20 easily follows from the first claim of Lemma 3.6 and γ ≤ γ0.
For proving Eq. 21, we consider a modified cheating adversary described below:
1. Given k, it runs the first stage of the adversary to obtain y along with the corresponding
state |ψ〉 = |ψ(k, y)〉.
2. Apply G1,γ,δ,....,Gi−1,γ,δ sequantially to obtain the state |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,1〉, which succeeds in non-
negligible probability since we assume the LHS of Eq. 21 is non-negligible. We denote by
Succ the event that it succeeds in generating the state. If it fails to generate the state, then
it override y by picking it in a way such that it can pass the test round with probability 1,
which can be done according to Fact 1. Then it sends y to the verifier.
3. Given a challenge ci, it works as follows:
• When ci = 0 (i.e., Test round), if Succ occurred, then it runs the cheating prover that is
assumed to exist in the second claim of Lemma 3.6 to generate an forth message accepted
with overwhelming probability. If Succ did not occur, then it returns a forth message
accepted with probability 1, which is possible by Fact 1.
• When ci = 0 (i.e., Hadamard round), if Succ occurred, then it runs the second stage of
the adversary with the internal state |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,1〉 to generate the forth message a. If
Succ did not occur, it just aborts.
Then we can see that this cheating adversary passes the test round with overwhelming probability
and passes the Hadamard round with the probability equal to the LHS of Eq. 21. Therefore, Eq. 21
follows from Lemma 3.1.
Now, we are ready to prove the theorem. First, we remark that it suffices to show that for any
µ = 1/poly(n), there exists m = O(log(n)) such that the success probability of the cheating prover
is at most µ. This is because we are considering ω(log(n))-parallel repetition, in which case the
number of trials is larger than any m = O(log(n)) for sufficiently large n, and thus we can do the
same analyses focusing on the first m trials and ignoring the rest of the trials. Specifically, we set
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m = log 1
µ2
, γ0 = 2
−2m, and T = 2m. Then we have
Pr[M ◦ ((V1,c1 · · ·Vm,cm)Uc |ψ〉) = ⊤]
≤ (m+ 2)(
m∑
i=1
‖ |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,ci〉 ‖
2 Pr[M ◦
(
(V1,c1 · · ·Vm,cm)Uc |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,ci〉
)
= ⊤]
+ ‖ |ψc¯1,...,c¯m〉 ‖
2 Pr[M ◦ ((V1,c1 · · ·Vm,cm)Uc |ψc¯1,...,c¯m〉) = ⊤]
+ ‖ |ψerr〉 ‖
2 Pr[M ◦ ((V1,c1 · · ·Vm,cm)Uc |ψerr〉) = ⊤]))
≤ (m+ 2)(
m∑
i=1
‖ |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,ci〉 ‖
2 Pr[Mi ◦
(
Vi,ciUc |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,ci〉
)
= ⊤]
+ ‖ |ψc¯1,...,c¯m〉 ‖
2 + ‖ |ψerr〉 ‖
2)
≤ (m2mγ0 + negl(n) + 2
−m +
m2
T
+ negl(n))(m+ 2) ≤ µ.
The first inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The second inequality follows from
the fact that V1, . . . , Vm commute, and thus we can choose Vi,ci to be the first operator operating
on |ψc¯1,...,c¯i−1,ci〉. The third inequality follows from Eq. 20 and 21, which give an upper bound of
the first term and Lemma 3.6, which give upper bounds of the second and third terms. The last
inequality follows from our choices of γ0, T , and m.
4 Two-Round Protocol via Fiat-Shamir Transform
In this section, we show that if we apply the Fiat-Shamir transform to m-parallel version of the
Mahadev’s protocol, then we obtain two-round protocol in the QROM. That is, we prove the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Assuming LWE assumption, there exists a two-round CVQC protocol with over-
whelming completeness and negligible soundness error in the QROM.
Proof. Letm > n be a sufficiently large integer so thatm-parallel version of the Mahadev’s protocol
has negligible soundness. For notational simplicity, we abuse the notation to simply use Vi, Pi, and
Vout to mean the m-parallel repetitions of them. Let H : Y → {0, 1}
m be a hash function idealized
as a quantum random oracle where X is the space of the second message y and Y = {0, 1}m. Our
two-round protocol is described below:
First Message: The verifier runs V1 to generate (k, td). Then it sends k to the prover and keeps
td as its state.
Second Message: The prover runs P2 on input k to generate y along with the prover’s state |stP 〉.
Then set c := H(y), and runs P4 on input |stP 〉 and y to generate a. Finally, it returns (y, a)
to the verifier.
Verification: The verifier computes c = H(y), runs Vout(k, td, y, c, a), and outputs as Vout outputs.
It is clear that the completeness is preserved given that H is a random oracle. We reduce the
soundness of this protocol to the soundness of m-parallel version of the Mahadev’s protocol. For
proving this, we borrow the following lemma shown in [DFMS19].
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Lemma 4.2 ([DFMS19, Theorem 2]). Let Y be finite non-empty sets. There exists a black-box
polynomial-time two-stage quantum algorithm S with the following property. Let A be an arbitrary
oracle quantum algorithm that makes q queries to a uniformly random H : Y → {0, 1}m and that
outputs some y ∈ Y and output a. Then, the two-stage algorithm SA outputs y ∈ Y in the first
stage and, upon a random c ∈ {0, 1}m as input to the second stage, output a so that for any x◦ ∈ X
and any predicate V :
Pr
c
[
V (y, c, a) : (y, a)
$
← 〈SA, c〉
]
≤
1
O(q2)
Pr
H
[
V (y,H(y), a) : (y, a)
$
← AH
]
−
1
2m+1q
,
where (y, a)
$
← 〈SA, c〉 means that SA outputs y and a in the first and second stages respectively on
the second stage input c.
We assume that there exists an efficient adversary A that breaks the soundness of the above
two-round protocol. We fix x /∈ L on which A succeeds in cheating. We fix (k, td) that is in the
support of the verifier’s first message. We apply Lemma 4.2 for A = A(k) and V = Vout(k, td, ·, ·, ·),
to obtain an algorithm SA(k) that satisfies
Pr
c
[
Vout(k, td, y, c, a) : (y, a)
$
← 〈SA(k), c〉
]
≤
1
O(q2)
Pr
H
[
Vout(k, td, y,H(y), a) : (y, a)
$
← AH(k)
]
−
1
2m+1q
.
Averaging over all possible (k, td), we have
Pr
k,td,c
[
Vout(k, td, y, c, a) : (y, a)
$
← 〈SA(k), c〉
]
≤
1
O(q2)
Pr
k,td,H
[
Vout(k, td, y,H(y), a) : (y, a)
$
← AH(k)
]
−
1
2m+1q
.
Since we assume that A breaks the soundness of the above two-round protocol,
Pr
k,td,H
[
Vout(k, td, y,H(y), a) : (y, a)
$
← AH(k)
]
is non-negligible in n. Therefore, as long as q = poly(n),
Pr
k,td,c∗
[
Vout(k, td, y, c
∗, a) : (y, a) $← 〈SA(k), c∗〉
]
is also non-negligible in n. Then, we construct an adversary B that breaks the soundness of parallel
version of Mahadev’s protocol as follows:
Second Message: Given the first message k, B runs the first stage of SA(k) to obtain y. It sends
y to the verifier.
Forth Message: Given the third message c, B gives c to SA(k) as the second stage input, and let
a be the output of it. Then B sends a to the verifier.
Clearly, the probability that B succeeds in cheating is
Pr
k,td,c∗
[
Vout(k, td, y, c
∗, a) : (y, a) $← 〈SA(k), c∗〉
]
,
which is non-negligible in n. This contradicts the soundness of m-parallel version of Mahadev’s
protocol (Theorem 3.3). Therefore we conclude that there does not exists an adversary that succeeds
in the two-round protocol with non-negligible probability assuming LWE in the QROM.
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5 Making Verifier Efficient
In this section, we construct a CVQC protocol with efficient verification in the CRS+QRO model
where a classical common reference string is available for both prover and verifier in addition to
quantum access to QRO. Our main theorem in this section is stated as follows:
Theorem 5.1. Assuming LWE assumption and existence of post-quantum iO, post-quantum FHE,
and two-round CVQC protocol in the standard model, there exists a two-round CVQC protocol for
QTIME(T ) with verification complexity poly(n, log T ) in the CRS+QRO model.
Remark 2. One may think that the underlying two-round CVQC protocol can be in the QROM
instead of in the standard model since we rely on the QROM anyway. However, this is not the
case since we need to use the underlying two-round CVQC in a non-black box way, which cannot
be done if that is in the QROM. Since our two-round protocol given in Sec. 4 is only proven secure
in the QROM, we do not know any two-round CVQC protocol provably secure in the standard
model. On the other hand, it is widely used heuristic in cryptography that a scheme proven secure
in the QROM is also secure in the standard model if the QRO is instantiated by a well-designed
cryptographic hash function such as SHA-3. Therefore, we believe that it is reasonable to assume
that a standard model instantiation of the scheme in Sec. 4 with a concrete hash function is sound.
Remark 3. One may think we need not assume CRS in addition to QRO since CRS may be replaced
with an output of QRO. This can be done if CRS is just a uniformly random string. However, in
our construction, CRS is non-uniform and has a certain structure. Therefore we cannot implement
CRS by QRO.
5.1 Preparation
First, we prepare a lemma that is used in our security proof.
Lemma 5.2. For any finite sets X and Y and two-stage oracle-aided quantum algorithm A =
(A1,A2), we have
Pr
[
1
$
← AH2 (|stA〉 , z) : |stA〉
$
← AH1 ()
]
− Pr
[
1
$
← A
H[z,G]
2 (|stA〉 , z) : |stA〉
$
← AH1 ()
]
≤ q12
− ℓ
2
+1
where z
$
← {0, 1}ℓ, H
$
← Func({0, 1}ℓ × X ,Y), G
$
← Func(X ,Y), H[z,G] is defined by
H[z,G](z′, x) =
{
G(x) if z′ = z
H(z′, x) else
.
where q1 denotes the maximal number of queries by A1.
This can be proven similarly to [SXY18, Lemma 2.2]. We give a proof in Appendix A for
completeness.
5.2 Four-Round Protocol
First, we construct a four-round scheme with efficient verification, which is transformed into two-
round protocol in the next subsection. Our construction is based on the following building blocks:
• A two-round CVQC protocol Π = (P = P2, V = (V1, Vout)) in the standard model, which
works as follows:
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V1: On input the security parameter 1
n and x, it generates a pair (k, td) of a“key” and
“trapdoor”, sends k to P , and keeps td as its internal state.
P2: On input x and k, it generates a response e and sends it to V .
Vout: On input x, k, td, e, it returns ⊤ indicating acceptance or ⊥ indicating rejection.
• A post-quantum PRG PRG : {0, 1}ℓs → {0, 1}ℓr where ℓr is the length of randomness for V1.
• An FHE scheme ΠFHE = (FHE.KeyGen,FHE.Enc,FHE.Eval,FHE.Dec) with post-quantum CPA
security.
• A strong output compressing randomized encoding scheme ΠRE = (RE.Setup,RE.Enc,RE.Dec)
with post-quantum security. We denote the simulator for ΠRE by Sre.
• A SNARK ΠSNARK = (Psnark, Vsnark) in the QROM for an NP language Lsnark defined below:
We have (x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′) ∈ Lsnark if and only if there exists e such that ct′ = FHE.Eval(pkfhe,
C[x, e], ct) where C[x, e] is a circuit that works as follows:
C[x, e](s): Given input s, it computes (k, td)
$
← V1(1
n, x;PRG(s)), and returns 1 if and only
if Vout(x, k, td, e) = ⊤ and 0 otherwise.
Let L be a BPP language decided by a quantum Turing machine QTM (i.e., for any x ∈
{0, 1}∗, x ∈ L if and only if QTM accepts x), and for any T , LT denotes the set consisting
of x ∈ L such that QTM accepts x in T steps. Then we construct a 4-round CVQC protocol
(Setupeff , Peff = (Peff ,2, Peff ,4), Veff = (Veff ,1, Veff ,3, Veff ,out)) for LT in the CRS+QRO model where
the verifier’s efficiency only logarithmically depends on T . Let H : {0, 1}2n ×{0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n be
a quantum random oracle.
Setupeff(1
n): The setup algorithm takes the security parameter 1n as input, generates crsre
$
← {0, 1}ℓ
and computes ekre
$
← RE.Setup(1n, 1ℓ, crsre) where ℓ is a parameter specified later. Then it
outputs a CRS for verifier crsVeff := ekre and a CRS for prover crsPeff := crsre.
4
V Heff,1: Given crsVeff = ekre and x, it generates s
$
← {0, 1}ℓs and (pkfhe, skfhe)
$
← FHE.KeyGen(1n),
computes ct
$
← FHE.Enc(pkfhe, s) and M̂inp
$
← RE.Enc(ekre,M, s, T
′) where M is a Turing
machine that works as follows:
M(s): Given an input s ∈ {0, 1}ℓs , it computes (k, td)
$
← V1(1
n, x;PRG(s)) and outputs k
and T ′ is specified later. Then it sends (M̂inp, pkfhe, ct) to Peff and keeps skfhe as its internal
state.
PHeff ,2: Given crsPeff = crsre, x and the message (M̂inp, pkfhe, ct) from the verifier, it computes k ←
RE.Dec(crsre, M̂inp), e
$
← P2(x, k), and ct
′ ← FHE.Eval(pkfhe, C[x, e], ct) where C[x, e] is a
classical circuit defined above. Then it sends ct′ to P and keeps (pkfhe, ct, ct′, e) as its state.
V Heff,3 Upon receiving ct
′, it randomly picks z $← {0, 1}2n and sends z to Peff .
PHeff ,4 Upon receiving z, it computes πsnark
$
← P
H(z,·)
snark ((x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′), e) and sends πsnark to Veff .
V Heff,out: It returns ⊤ if V
H(z,·)
snark ((x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′), πsnark) = ⊤ and 1 ← FHE.Dec(skfhe, ct′) and ⊥
otherwise.
4We note that we divide the CRS into crsVeff and crsPeff just for the verifier efficiency and soundness still holds
even if a cheating prover sees crsVeff .
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Choice of parameters.
• We set ℓ to be an upper bound of the length of k where (k, td)
$
← V1(1
n, x) for x ∈ LT . We
note that we have ℓ = poly(n, T ).
• We set T ′ to be an upperbound of the running time of M on input s ∈ {0, 1}ℓs when x ∈ LT .
We note that we have T ′ = poly(n, T ).
Verification Efficiency. By encoding efficiency of ΠRE and verification efficiency of ΠSNARK,
Veff runs in time poly(n, |x|, log T ).
Theorem 5.3 (Completeness). For any x ∈ LT ,
Pr
[
〈PHeff (crsPeff ), V
H
eff (crsVeff )〉(x) = ⊥
]
= negl(n)
where (crsPeff , crsVeff )
$
← Setupeff(1
n).
Proof. This easily follows from completeness and correctness of the underlying primitives.
Theorem 5.4 (Soundness). For any x /∈ LT any efficient quantum cheating prover A,
Pr
[
〈AH(crsPeff , crsVeff ), V
H
eff (crsVeff )〉(x) = ⊤
]
= negl(n)
where (crsPeff , crsVeff )
$
← Setupeff(1
n).
Proof. We fix T and x /∈ LT . Let A be a cheating prover. First, we divides A into the first stage
A1, which is given (crsPeff , crsVeff ) and the first message and outputs the second message ct
′ and
its internal state |stA〉, and the second stage A2, which is given the internal state |stA〉 and the
third message and outputs the fourth message πsnark. We consider the following sequence of games
between an adversary A = (A1,A2) and a challenger. Let q1 and q2 be an upper bound of number
of random oracle queries by A1 and A2, respectively. We denote the event that the challenger
returns 1 in Gamei by Ti.
Game1: This is the original soundness game. Specifically, the game runs as follows:
1. The challenger generates H
$
← Func({0, 1}2n × {0, 1}2n, {0, 1}n), crsre
$
← {0, 1}ℓ, s
$
←
{0, 1}ℓs , and (pkfhe, skfhe)
$
← FHE.KeyGen(1n), and computes ekre
$
← RE.Setup(1n, 1ℓ, crsre),
ct
$
← FHE.Enc(pkfhe, s), and M̂inp
$
← RE.Enc(ekre,M, s, T
′).
2. AH1 is given crsPeff := crsre, crsVeff := ekre and the first message (M̂inp, pkfhe, ct), and
outputs the second message ct′ and its internal state |stA〉.
3. The challenger randomly picks z
$
← {0, 1}2n.
4. AH2 is given the state |stA〉 and the third message z and outputs πsnark.
5. The challenger returns 1 if V
H(z,·)
snark ((x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′), πsnark) = ⊤ and 1← FHE.Dec(skfhe, ct′)
and 0 otherwise.
Game2: This game is identical to the previous game except that the oracles given to A2 and Vsnark
are replaced withH[z,G] andG in Step 4 and 5 respectively whereG
$
← Func({0, 1}2n, {0, 1}n)
and H[z,G] is as defined in Lemma 5.2. We note that the oracle given to A1 in Step 2 is
unchanged from H.
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Game3: This game is identical to the previous game except that Step 4 and 5 are modified as
follows:
4. The challenger runs e
$
← ExtA
′
2[H,|stA〉,z]((x, pkfhe, ct, ct′), 1q2 , 1n) where A′2[H, stA, z] is an
oracle-aided quantum algorithm that is given an oracle G and emulates A
H[z,G]
2 (|stA〉 , z).
5. The challenger returns 1 if e is a valid witness for (x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′) ∈ Lsnark and 1 ←
FHE.Dec(skfhe, ct
′) and 0 otherwise.
Game4: This game is identical to the previous game except that Step 5 is modified as follows:
5. The challenger returns 1 if e is a valid witness for (x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′) ∈ Lsnark, and Vout(x, k, td, e) =
⊤ where (k, td)
$
← V1(1
n, x;PRG(s)) and 0 otherwise.
Game5: This game is identical to the previous game except that ct is generated as ct
$
← FHE.Enc(pkfhe,
02n) in Step 1.
Game6: This game is identical to the previous game except that crsre, ekre, and M̂inp are generated in
a different way. Specifically, in Step 1, the challenger computes (k, td)
$
← V1(1
n, x;PRG(s)),
(crsre, M̂inp)
$
← Sre(1
n, 1|M |, 1ℓs , k, T ∗), and ekre
$
← RE.Setup(1n, 1ℓ, crsre) where T
∗ is the
running time of M(inp). We note that the same (k, td) generated in this step is also used in
Step 5.
Game7: This game is identical to the previous game except that PRG(s) used for generating (k, td)
in Step 1 is replaced with a true randomness.
This completes the descriptions of games. Our goal is to prove Pr[T1] = negl(n). We prove
this by the following lemmas. Since Lemmas 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10 can be proven by straightforward
reductions, we only give proofs for the rest of lemmas.
Lemma 5.5. We have |Pr[T2]− Pr[T1]| ≤ q12
−(n+1).
Proof. This lemma is obtained by applying Lemma 5.2 for B = (B1,B2) described below:
BO11 (): It generates crsre
$
← {0, 1}ℓ, s
$
← {0, 1}ℓs , and (pkfhe, skfhe)
$
← FHE.KeyGen(1n), computes
ekre
$
← RE.Setup(1n, 1ℓ, crsre), ct
$
← FHE.Enc(pkfhe, s), M̂inp
$
← RE.Enc(ekre,M, s, T
′), and
ct
$
← FHE.Enc(pkfhe, s), and sets crsPeff = crsre and crsVeff := ekre. Then it runs (ct
′, |stA〉)
$
←
AO11 (crsPeff , crsVeff , x, (M̂inp, pkfhe, ct)), and outputs |stB〉 := (|stA〉 , x, M̂inp, ct, ct
′, skfhe).5
BO22 (|stB〉 , z): It runs πsnark
$
← AO22 (|stA〉), and outputs 1 if V
O2(z,·)
snark ((x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′), πsnark) = ⊤
and 1← FHE.Dec(skfhe, ct
′) and 0 otherwise.
Lemma 5.6. If ΠSNARK satisfies the extractability and Pr[T2] is non-negligible, then Pr[T3] is also
non-negligible.
5Classical strings are encoded as quantum states in a trivial manner.
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Proof. Let trans3 be the transcript of the protocol before the forth message is sent (i.e., trans3 =
(crsPeff , crsVeff , M̂inp, pkfhe, ct
′, z)). We say that (H, skfhe, trans3, |stA〉) is good if we randomly choose
G
$
← Func({0, 1}2n, {0, 1}n) and run πsnark
$
← A
H[z,G]
2 (|stA〉) to complete the transcript, then the
transcript is accepted (i.e., we have V Gsnark((x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′), πsnark) = ⊤ and 1← FHE.Dec(skfhe, ct′))
with non-negligible probability. By a standard averaging argument, if Pr[T2] is non-negligible, then
a non-negligible fraction of (H, skfhe, trans3, |stA〉) is good when they are generated as in Game2.
We fix good (trans3, skfhe, |stA〉). Then by the extractability of ΠSNARK, Ext succeeds in extracting
a witness for (x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′) ∈ Lsnark with non-negligible probability. Moreover, since we assume
(H, skfhe, trans3, |stA〉) is good, we always have 1← FHE.Dec(skfhe, ct′) (since otherwise a transcript
with prefix trans3 cannot be accepted). Therefore we can conclude that Pr[T3] is non-negligible.
Lemma 5.7. We have Pr[T4] = Pr[T3].
Proof. If e is a valid witness for (x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′) ∈ Lsnark, then we especially have ct′ = FHE.Eval(pkfhe,
C[x, e], ct). By the correctness of ΠFHE, we have FHE.Dec(skfhe, ct
′) = C[x, e](s) = (Vout(x, k, td, e)
?
=
⊤) where (k, td)
$
← V1(1
n, x;PRG(s)). Therefore, the challenger returns 1 in Game4 if and only if
it returns 1 in Game3.
Lemma 5.8. If ΠFHE is CPA-secure, then we have |Pr[T5]− Pr[T4]| ≤ negl(n).
Lemma 5.9. If ΠRE is secure, then we have |Pr[T6]− Pr[T5]| ≤ negl(n).
Lemma 5.10. If PRG is secure, then we have |Pr[T7]− Pr[T6]| ≤ negl(n).
Lemma 5.11. If (P, V ) satisfies soundness, then we have Pr[T7] ≤ negl(n).
Proof. Suppose that Pr[T7] is non-negligible. Then we construct an adversary B against the under-
lying two-round protocol as follows:
B(k): Given the first message k, it generatesH
$
← Func({0, 1}2n×{0, 1}2n, {0, 1}n), G
$
← Func({0, 1}2n,
{0, 1}n), z
$
← {0, 1}2n, (k, td)
$
← V1(1
n, x;PRG(s)), (crsre, M̂inp)
$
← Sre(1
n, 1|M |, 1ℓs , k, T ∗),
ekre
$
← RE.Setup(1n, 1ℓ, crsre), and (pkfhe, skfhe)
$
← FHE.KeyGen(1n), computes ct
$
← FHE.Enc(
pkfhe, 0
2n), and sets crsPeff = crsre and crsVeff := ekre. Then it runs (ct
′, |stA〉)
$
← AH1 (crsPeff , crsVeff ,
x, (M̂inp, pkfhe, ct)) and e
$
← ExtA
′
2[H,|stA〉,z]((x, pkfhe, ct, ct′), 1q2 , 1n) and outputs e.
Then we can easily see that the probability that we have Vout(x, k, td, e) is at least Pr[T7]. Therefore,
if the underlying two-round protocol is sound, then Pr[T7] = negl(n).
By combining Lemmas 5.5 to 5.10, we can see that if Pr[T1] is non-negligible, then Pr[T7] is also
non-negligible, which contradicts Lemma 5.11. Therefore we conclude that Pr[T1] = negl(n).
5.3 Reducing to Two-Round via Fiat-Shamir
Here, we show that the number of rounds can be reduced to 2 relying on another random oracle.
Namely, we observe that the third message of the scheme is just a public coin, and so we can
apply the Fiat-Shamir transform similarly to Sec.4. In the following, we describe the protocol for
completeness.
Our two-round CVQC protocol (Setupeff-fs, Peff-fs, Veff-fs = (Veff-fs,1, Veff-fs,out)) for LT in the
CRS+QRO model is described as follows. Let H : {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n be a quantum
random oracle and H ′ : {0, 1}ℓct′ → {0, 1}2n be another quantum random oracle where ℓct′ is the
maximal length of ct′ in the four-round scheme and ℓ and T ′ be as defined in the previous section.
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Setupeff-fs(1
n): The setup algorithm takes the security parameter 1n as input, generates crsre
$
←
{0, 1}ℓ and computes ekre
$
← RE.Setup(1n, 1ℓ, crsre). Then it outputs a CRS for verifier
crsVeff-fs := ekre and a CRS for prover crsPeff-fs := crsre.
V H,H
′
eff-fs,1: Given crsVeff-fs = ekre and x, it generates s
$
← {0, 1}ℓs and (pkfhe, skfhe)
$
← FHE.KeyGen(1n),
computes ct
$
← FHE.Enc(pkfhe, s) and M̂inp
$
← RE.Enc(ekre,M, s, T
′) where M is a Turing
machine that works as follows:
M(s): Given an input s ∈ {0, 1}ℓs , it computes (k, td)
$
← V1(1
n, x;PRG(s)) and outputs k.
Then it sends (M̂inp, pkfhe, ct) to Peff-fs and keeps skfhe as its internal state.
PH,H
′
eff-fs,2: Given crsPeff-fs = crsre, x and the message (M̂inp, pkfhe, ct) from the verifier, it computes
k ← RE.Dec(crsre, M̂inp), e
$
← P2(x, k), and ct
′ ← FHE.Eval(pkfhe, C[x, e], ct) where C[x, e]
is a classical circuit defined above. Then it computes z := H ′(ct′), computes πsnark
$
←
P
H(z,·)
snark ((x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′), e) and sends (ct′, πsnark) to Veff-fs.
V H,H
′
eff-fs,out: It computes z := H
′(ct′) and returns ⊤ if V H(z,·)snark ((x, pkfhe, ct, ct
′), πsnark) = ⊤ and 1 ←
FHE.Dec(skfhe, ct
′) and ⊥ otherwise.
Verification Efficiency. Clearly, the verification efficiency is preserved from the protocol in
Sec. 5.2
Theorem 5.12 (Completeness). For any x ∈ LT ,
Pr
[
〈PH,H
′
eff-fs (crsPeff-fs), V
H,H′
eff-fs (crsVeff-fs)〉(x) = ⊥
]
= negl(n)
where (crsPeff-fs , crsVeff-fs)
$
← Setupeff-fs(1
n).
Theorem 5.13 (Soundness). For any x /∈ LT any efficient quantum cheating prover A,
Pr
[
〈AH,H
′
(crsPeff-fs , crsVeff ), V
H,H′
eff-fs (crsVeff-fs)〉(x) = ⊤
]
= negl(n)
where (crsPeff-fs , crsVeff-fs)
$
← Setupeff-fs(1
n).
This can be reduced to Theorem 5.4 similarly to the proof of soundness of the protocol in Sec. 4.
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A Proof of Lemma 5.2
Here, we give a proof of Lemma 5.2. We note that the proof is essentially the same as the proof of
[SXY18, Lemma 2.2].
Before proving the lemma, we introduce another lemma, which gives a lower bound for a
decisional variant of Grover’s search problem.
Lemma A.1 ([SY17, Lemma C.1]). Let gz : {0, 1}
ℓ → {0, 1} denotes a function defined as gz(z) :=
1 and gz(z
′) := 0 for all z′ 6= z, and g⊥ : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} denotes a function that returns 0 for all
inputs. Then for any quantum adversary B = (B1,B2) we have∣∣∣Pr[1 $← B2(|stB〉 , z) | |stB〉 $← Bgz1 ()]− Pr[1 $← B2(|stB〉 , z) | |stB〉 $← Bg⊥1 ()]∣∣∣ ≤ q1 · 2− ℓ2+1.
where z
$
← {0, 1}ℓ and q1 denotes the maximal number of queries by B1.
Then we prove Lemma 5.2.
Proof. (of Lemma 5.2.) We consider the following sequence of games. We denote the event that
Gamei returns 1 by Ti.
Game1: This game simulates the environment of the first term of LHS in the inequality in the
lemma. Namely, the challenger chooses z
$
← {0, 1}ℓ, H
$
← Func({0, 1}ℓ ×X ,Y), A1 runs with
oracle H to generate |stA〉, A2 runs on input (|stA〉 , z) with oracle H to generate a bit b, and
the game returns b.
Game2: This game is identical to the previous game except that the oracle given to A1 is replaced
with H[z,G] where G
$
← Func(X ,Y).
Game3: This game is identical to the previous game except that the oracle given to A1 is replaced
with H and the oracle given to A2 is replaced with H[z,G]. We note that this game simulates
the environment as in the second term of the LHS in the inequality in the lemma.
What we need to prove is |Pr[T1] − Pr[T3]| ≤ q12
− ℓ
2
+1. First we observe that the change from
Game2 to Game3 is just conceptual and nothing changes from the adversary’s view since in both
games, the oracles given to A1 and A2 are random oracles that agrees on any input (z
′, x) such
that z′ 6= z and independent on any input (z, x). Therefore we have Pr[T2] = Pr[T3]. What is left
is to prove |Pr[T1]− Pr[T2]| ≤ q12
− ℓ
2
+1. For proving this, we construct an algorithm B = (B1,B2)
that breaks Lemma 5.2 with the advantage |Pr[T1]− Pr[T2] as follows:
Bg
∗
1 (): It generates H
$
← Func({0, 1}ℓ × X ,Y) and G
$
← Func(X ,Y), implements an oracle O1 as
O1(z
′, x) =
{
G(x) if g∗(z′) = 1
H(z′, x) else
,
runs |stA〉
$
← AO11 () and outputs |stB〉 := |stA〉
B2(|stB〉 = |stA〉 , z): It runs b
$
← AH2 (|stB〉 , z) and outputs b.
It is easy to see that if g∗ = g⊥, then B perfectly simulates Game1 for A and if g∗ = gz, then B
perfectly simulates Game2 for A. Therefore, we have |Pr[T1]−Pr[T2]| ≤ q12
− ℓ
2
+1 by Lemma 5.2.
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